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Abstract: Many think that Pascal’s Wager is a hopeless failure. A primary reason 
for this is because a number of challenging objections have been raised to the 
wager, including the “many-gods” objection and the “mixed strategy” objection. 
We argue that both objections are formal, but not substantive, problems for the 
wager, and that they both fail for the same reason. We then respond to additional 
objections to the wager. We show how a version of Pascalian reasoning succeeds, 
giving us a reason to pay special attention to the infinite consequences of our 
actions.
1. Introduction
The argument commonly known as “Pascal’s Wager” raises a host of in-
teresting questions: historical, mathematical, and philosophical. While his-
torically, several thinkers, including the Muslim philosopher and theologian 
Al-Ghazālī, have proposed versions of the wager (and Al-Ghazālī’s actually 
dates earlier than Pascal’s), we will keep to the current convention and refer 
to the famous argument as “Pascal’s Wager.”1 Our aim in this paper is not 
primarily historical, and we will not address the textual question of what Pas-
cal or Al-Ghazālī really meant.2 When we refer to “Pascal’s Wager” we will 
1. For more on Al-Ghazālī’s version of the wager, see Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazālī, The 
Alchemy of Happiness, trans. Claud Field (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1991); Mohammad Shahid 
Alam, “Pragmatic Arguments for Belief in the Qur’an,” http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1895559.
2. For discussions of historical questions, see essays in Nicolas Hammond, ed., The Cam-
bridge Companion to Pascal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Graeme Hunter, 
Pascal the Philosopher: An Introduction (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013); Joseph 
Anderson and Daniel Collette, “Wagering with and without Pascal,” Res Philosophica 95 (2017): 
95–110; Paul Bartha and Lawrence Pasternack, eds., Pascal’s Wager (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2018), part 1. For introductions to the wager, see Jeff Jordan, “Pascal’s Wagers and 
James’s Will to Believe,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, ed. William J. Wain-
wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Craig Duncan, “Religion and Secular Utility: 
Happiness, Truth, and Pragmatic Arguments for Theistic Belief,” Philosophy Compass 8 (2013): 
381–99; Alan Hájek, “Pascal’s Ultimate Gamble,” The Norton Introduction to Philosophy, ed. Alex 
Byrne, Joshua Cohen, Gideon Rosen, and Seana Shiffrin (New York: Norton, 2015); Alan Hájek, 
“Pascal’s Wager,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta, accessed June 19, 
2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pascal-wager/; Michael Rota, “Pascal’s Wager,” Philoso-
phy Compass 12 (2017): 1–11.
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simply be referring to the following decision matrix. Any probability higher 
than zero for the hypothesis God exists gives us the following expected values 
(EV), where f is some finite number:
Table 1.
God Exists God Does Not Exist
Believe in God ∞ f
Do Not Believe in God −∞ f
The expected value for believing is infinitely positive and the expected value 
for not believing is infinitely negative.3 Choosing to believe in God is the 
best option given this matrix. As Pascal said, “Wager, then, without hesita-
tion that [God] is” because “there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life 
to gain” and “what you stake is finite.”4 In this paper, we outline a number of 
key objections to the wager, and we explain how the wager can still be useful 
3. One might object that our use of negative infinity is illegitimate here because negative 
infinity is mathematically undefined. However, we aren’t referring to “negative infinity” as a 
number, which is mathematically objectionable, but rather, as an infinite amount of bad or un-
desirable goods. 
4. Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. William Trotter (New York: J. M. Dent, 1958), fragments 233–
41. For defenses of Pascal’s Wager, see Michael Martin, “On Four Critiques of Pascal’s Wager,” So-
phia 14 (1975): 1–11; Geoffrey Brown, “A Defence of Pascal’s Wager,” Religious Studies 20 (1984): 
465–79; Nicholas Rescher, Pascal’s Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Natural Theology 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985); Thomas V. Morris, “Pascalian Wager-
ing,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (1986): 437–54; William Lycan and George Schlesinger, 
“You Bet Your Life: Pascal’s Wager Defended,” Reason and Responsibility, 7th ed., ed. Joel Fein-
berg (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1989); Jeff Jordan, “The Many-Gods Objection and Pascal’s Wa-
ger,” International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1991): 309–17; Jeff Jordan, “Pascal’s Wager and the 
Problem of Infinite Utilities,” Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993): 49–59; Jeff Jordan, “Pascal’s Wager 
Revisited,” Religious Studies 34 (1998): 419–31; Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager: Pragmatic Arguments 
and Belief in God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Jeffrey Jordan, “Theistic Belief 
and Religious Uncertainty,” 2008, https://infidels.org/library/modern/jeffrey_jordan/belief.html; 
Joshua Golding, “Pascal’s Wager,” The Modern Schoolman 71 (1994): 115–43; Douglas Groothuis, 
“Wagering Belief: Examining Two Objections to Pascal’s Wager,” Religious Studies 30 (1994): 
479–86; John Byl, “On Pascal’s Wager and Infinite Utilities,” Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994): 
467–73; Howard Sobel, “Pascalian Wagers,” Synthese 108 (1996): 11–61; James Franklin, “Two 
Caricatures, I: Pascal’s Wager,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998): 115–19; 
Ward Jones, “Religious Conversion, Self‐Deception, and Pascal’s Wager,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 36 (1998): 167–88; Paul Bartha, “Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal’s Wager and 
Relative Utilities,” Synthese 154 (2007): 5–52; Frederik Herzberg, “Hyperreal Expected Utilities 
and Pascal’s Wager,” Logique et Analyse 213 (2011): 69–108; Bradley Monton, “Mixed Strategies 
Can’t Evade Pascal’s Wager,” Analysis 71 (2011): 642–5; Lawrence Pasternack, “The Many Gods 
Objection to Pascal’s Wager: A Decision Theoretic Response,” Philo 15 (2012): 158–78; Paul Bar-
tha, “Many Gods, Many Wagers: Pascal’s Wager Meets the Replicator Dynamics,” in Probability 
in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 187–206; Michael Rota, “A Better Version of Pascal’s Wager,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2016): 415–39; Michael Rota, Taking Pascal’s Wager: Faith, 
Evidence, and the Abundant Life (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2016).
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for choosing between worldviews in spite of these objections.5 In particular, 
we show how Pascalian reasoning gives us a reason to care about the (poten-
tially) infinite consequences of our actions; finite ones only come in when the 
infinite ones are balanced.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we explain the many-
gods objection and the mixed strategies objection, and how they pose a prob-
lem for traditional formulations of the wager. In section 3, we use two thought 
experiments to show that these objections are structural, but not substantive 
problems, for the wager. In section 4, we suggest a particular method of com-
paring worldviews and provide an example of how one might salvage the sub-
stance of the wager in light of these objections. In section 5, we address other 
objections to the wager that apply to our formulation and argue that many 
of them can actually be incorporated into the decision matrix. We conclude 
in section 6 that something in the spirit of the wager can be salvaged while 
incorporating many prominent objections.
5. For objections to Pascal’s Wager (some, but not all, of which we respond to below) see 
William Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” in Lectures and Essays (Macmillan, 1879); Antony Flew, 
“Is Pascal’s Wager the Only Safe Bet?,” Rationalist Annual 76 (1960): 21–5; Antony Flew, “The 
Presumption of Atheism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1972): 29–46; Antony Flew, The 
Presumption of Atheism and Other Philosophical Essays on God, Freedom and Immortality (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1976); James Cargile, “Pascal’s Wager,” Philosophy 35 (1966): 250–7; Ian 
Hacking, “The Logic of Pascal’s Wager,” American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1972): 186–92; 
Larimore Nicholl, “Pascal’s Wager: The Bet Is Off,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
39 (1978): 274–80; J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982); Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1990); Michael Martin, “Pascal’s Wager as an Argument for Not Believing in God,” Reli-
gious Studies 19 (1983): 57–64; Anthony Duff, “Pascal’s Wager and Infinite Utilities,” Analysis 46 
(1986): 107–9; Graham Oppy, “On Rescher on Pascal’s Wager,” International Journal for Philoso-
phy of Religion 30 (1991): 159–68; Gregory Mougin and Elliott Sober, “Betting against Pascal’s 
Wager,” Noûs 28 (1994): 382–95; Robert Amico, “Pascal’s Wager Revisited,” International Studies 
in Philosophy 26 (1994): 1–11; William Gustason, “Pascal’s Wager and Competing Faiths,” Inter-
national Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998): 31–9; Bradley Armour-Garb, “Betting on 
God,” Religious Studies 35 (1999): 119–38; Alan Carter, “On Pascal’s Wager, or Why All Bets Are 
Off,” Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 22–7; Alan Hájek, “Objecting Vaguely to Pascal’s Wager,” 
Philosophical Studies 98 (2000): 1–16; Alan Hájek, “Waging War on Pascal’s Wager,” Philosophi-
cal Review 112 (2003): 27–56; Alan Hájek, “Blaise and Bayes,” in Probability in the Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
167–86; Paul Saka, “Pascal’s Wager and the Many Gods Objection,” Religious Studies 37 (2001): 
321–41; Allen Wood, “The Duty to Believe according to the Evidence,” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 63 (2008): 7–24; Nick Bostrom, “Pascal’s Mugging,” Analysis 69 (2009): 
443–5; Sharon Ryan, “In Defense of Moral Evidentialism,” Logos and Episteme 6 (2015): 405–27. 
See also Jeff Jordan, ed., Gambling on God (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994).
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2. Two Prominent Objections
2.1. The Many-Gods Objection
One common objection to Pascal’s Wager is to point out that the Chris-
tian God isn’t the only God possible; the Gods of other worldviews need to 
be included in the matrix. Many of these worldviews are mutually exclusive, 
and believing the truth of one religion will often not give you the payoff of an-
other. If one adds a Muslim God who sends Christians to hell, then the results 
become inconclusive. Any set of nonzero values for probability of Christian-
ity and probability of Islam will give us the following, somewhat confusing, 
results.
Table 2.
Christianity 
Is True
Islam 
Is True
Atheism 
Is True
Expected 
Value (EV)
Believe 
Christianity ∞ −∞ f ∞ + −∞
Believe 
Islam −∞ ∞ f ∞ + −∞
Believe 
Atheism −∞ −∞ f −∞
The expected values seem to imply that atheism is not a wise choice. 
However, atheism can avoid this negative outcome. For example, in “Betting 
against Pascal’s Wager,” Gregory Mougin and Elliott Sober suggest the pos-
sibility of some heretofore undiscovered laws of nature that cause atheists to 
experience eternal pleasure after death and theists to experience eternal pain 
after death—essentially a naturalist version of heaven and hell (“Atheism+” 
from now on).6 Even if one thinks that Atheism+ is improbable, it is logically 
possible and should be assigned a nonzero probability.7 Given Atheism+, it 
is not obvious that any of the three options is better or worse than any other.
6. Mougin and Sober, “Betting against Pascal’s Wager,” 386. Note, however, that Mougin and 
Sober’s main argument is distinct from the many-gods objection and goes beyond merely point-
ing out that Atheism+ is a possibility. This is one subpoint made in Sober and Mougin’s series 
of interesting objections to Pascal’s wager, several of which we do not have space to respond to 
here. Thanks to Elliott Sober.
7.  If for no other reason, because of the axiom of regularity: namely, that only (known?) 
necessary falsehoods should be assigned probability 0. See David Lewis, “A Subjectivist’s Guide 
to Objective Chance,” in Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, ed. R. Jeffrey (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1980), 263–93; Brian Skyrms, Causal Necessity (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1980).
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Table 3.
Christianity 
Is True
Islam 
Is True
Atheism+ 
Is True
Expected 
Value (EV)
Believe 
Christianity ∞ −∞ −∞
∞ + −∞ 
+ −∞
Believe 
Islam −∞ ∞ −∞
∞ + −∞ 
+ −∞
Believe 
Atheism −∞ −∞ ∞
∞ + −∞ 
+ −∞
If there is a small chance that Atheism+ is true, then we don’t have a 
decision theoretic reason to be a theist rather than an atheist. In fact, since all 
worldviews end up with the same perplexing expected value on this formula-
tion of the wager, there is no reason to pick one over another. Therefore, the 
many-gods objection seems to show that Pascal’s Wager is useless for decid-
ing between worldviews.
2.2. The Mixed Strategies Objection
Anthony Duff, in “Pascal’s Wager and Infinite Utilities,” and Alan Hájek, 
in “Waging War on Pascal’s Wager,” argue that, not only is the wager useless 
for choosing between worldviews, but incorporating infinities into decision 
theory gives all decisions the same expected value. Pascal’s original wager has 
been considered such a powerful argument because, if correct, it purported 
to show that your credence in theism doesn’t matter—as long as it is a positive 
number—because that number multiplied by infinity will always be infinite. 
Thus, believing in God has an infinite expected value. However, consider the 
following alternative decision: flip a coin, and if that coin lands heads, believe 
in God. If it is tails, do nothing. While this lowers the probability that you’ll 
believe in God to 0.5, this action still has an infinite expected value (0.5 × 
your credence in theism × infinity). Thus, you have no reason to believe in 
God directly, rather than flip a coin, and, if it lands heads, believe in God. 
Both options have infinite expected value.
Hájek and Duff point out that, using this same logic, you can show that 
any decision has infinite expected value. This is because any decision you 
might make includes the positive probability that you will eventually come 
to believe in God. This probability, no matter how small, when multiplied by 
the infinite reward of heaven, gives the decision an infinite expected value. 
As Hájek puts it:
Wager for God if and only if a die lands 6 (a sixth times infinity equals 
infinity); if and only if your lottery ticket wins next week; if and only if 
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you see a meteor quantum-tunnel its way through the side of a moun-
tain and come out the other side. . . . Pascal has ignored all these mixed 
strategies—probabilistic mixtures of the ‘pure actions’ of wagering for 
and wagering against God—and infinitely many more besides. And all 
of them have maximal expectation. Nothing in his argument favors 
wagering for God over all of these alternative strategies.8
In other words, any action which could potentially lead to belief in God, no 
matter how small the probability (as long as it’s positive), has infinite expect-
ed value. For example, since the probability of eventually coming to believe 
in God given the decision to tie your shoe is greater than zero, the expected 
value of tying your shoe is infinite. Duff concludes, “I have, therefore, no 
reason to try to increase the probability that I will come to believe in God, 
since no such increase in probability can increase the expected value of my 
actions—which is already infinite.”9 Thus, according to the mixed strategies 
objection, the wager has essentially zero practical import; as soon as Pascal’s 
infinities are introduced into decision theory, we have no reason to perform 
any action rather than another action.
3. Comparing Infinities
To a large extent we agree with the points made by advocates of the many-
gods and mixed strategies objections; they bring out real problems with Pas-
cal’s Wager. However, we think that they prove too much if an implication 
of their arguments is that we cannot rationally rank one infinite good over 
another using contemporary decision theory.10 Put differently: they bring out 
important structural, but not substantive, problems with the wager. This is 
because there are many situations where it is clearly rational to prefer one 
infinite good to another. Two such examples are as follows.
3.1. Eternity of Ecstasy versus 
Eternity of Moderate Happiness
Imagine a relatively happy moment of your life: perhaps receiving a good 
grade on a test or enjoying a decent meal. Now imagine one of the most in-
credibly joyous occasions of your life: a moment of great love, compassion, 
glory, creativity, for example, your wedding day, being offered your dream 
job, and so on. Now suppose that you have the option to choose between 
two “heavens.” In the first heaven, the moderately good moment is repeated 
infinitely for an eternity of moderate happiness. In the second version, the 
8. Hájek, “Waging War on Pascal’s Wager,” 31.
9. Duff, “Pascal’s Wager and Infinite Utilities,” 108.
10. Ibid., 109.
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moment of peak joy is repeated infinitely for an eternity of ecstasy. However, 
without a way to compare infinities, we are multiplying a finite amount of 
happiness by infinity, so the result will be infinite for both. Therefore, it ap-
pears like advocates of the above objections have proved too much, because 
one should prefer the infinity of ecstasy to the infinity of moderate happiness.
3.2. Same Happiness, Different Probability
Imagine that you have two eternities laid before you. Both “heavens” are 
infinite, and in both, you will experience the same level of happiness at each 
moment. The catch is, neither guarantees you will receive its reward; in each, 
there is a chance you could be annihilated instead. In the first heaven, the 
probability you will get the reward is 0.000001. In the second heaven, the 
probability you will get the reward is 0.999999. Both heavens offer the same 
payoff, but it is clear that you should prefer the second to the first, if given 
a choice. Therefore, simply because two worldviews offer the same infinite 
rewards does not necessarily mean they have equal expected value; the prob-
ability you will get the reward is a key a part of the equation.
These two thought experiments show that, in many cases, depending on 
the value of the payout and probability you will get it, it is rational to prefer 
one infinity to another. Thus, while the many-gods and the mixed strategies 
objections raise an important technical problem with the wager (and deci-
sion theory more generally), these thought experiments show that the prob-
lem is not a substantive one, as long as we have a way of altering decision 
theory so we can utilize it to compare different infinite payoffs. Below, we 
suggest one possible way to do so; however, our method below is only an 
example of how this might work. Our main goal is not necessarily to commit 
to this technical apparatus in particular, but to give an extended example that 
shows that there are ways to salvage decision theory and the wager in light of 
these objections.11
4. Salvaging Pascal’s Wager
In order to address both objections at once, we propose that one deal 
with infinity differently than it is dealt with in the standard formulation of 
the wager. In the standard formulation, the agent’s credences are multiplied 
by infinity for the worldviews offering infinite rewards and, as long as the cre-
11. Hájek, “Waging War on Pascal’s Wager,” section 4, suggests a number of ways one might 
compare infinite payoffs. See also Eddy Chen and Daniel Rubio, “Surreal Decisions,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming (available at https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12510) 
for a similar framework that uses surreal numbers. 
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dences are positive, this always leads to an infinite expected value. We suggest 
a reformulation to how the quantities of infinity are compared.
4.1. Pleasure or Utility per Period
First, we will distinguish the amount of pleasure or utility in a particular 
moment from the duration of time for which that utility persists. We will 
assume it is possible for a finite being to exist for an infinite amount of time, 
but that it is impossible for a finite being to experience an infinite amount of 
pleasure or utility at any particular moment.12 
Hájek proposes approaching infinites in a similar way; he considers both 
the idea of using finite utilities over an infinite time period and the idea that 
humans have a saturation point for experiencing utility. (Here, a “saturation 
point” refers to the maximum amount of pleasure or utility a human can 
experience in a single moment). Hájek points out that, if God could have 
created beings with a higher saturation point, salvation would no longer 
be the greatest thing possible. Pascal would have rejected this assumption, 
and Hájek rejects this approach because it is not true to the spirit of Pascal.13 
However, this seems to be more of a problem for Pascal’s theology than an 
objection to the reformulated wager itself. This may come down to a differ-
ence of priorities; Hájek may very well be right that, as a historical matter, 
Pascal would be unsatisfied with a reformulation that uses finite utilities over 
an infinite time. However, we are less concerned with historical questions and 
more concerned with a different feature of Pascal’s Wager, namely, whether it 
gives a decision theoretic reason for agents to pay attention to infinite afterlife 
gains and losses.
12. While we are willing to flag this as an assumption as our project and leave it at that, 
we also think this assumption has intuitive appeal, because an infinite experience in a moment 
would require an infinite capacity in the being having the experience. E.g., it seems metaphysi-
cally possible for a person to eat food for all eternity, but it seems impossible for a person to eat 
an infinite amount of food all at once. One way our project could be expanded is to do away 
with this assumption. If one thought that “supertasks” were metaphysically possible for humans 
(or something similar which would enable humans to experience infinite pleasure in a finite 
amount of time), then different sizes of infinity could be compared and result in a similar ratio 
to ours (that concerns finite numbers). Bartha, “Taking Stock of Infinite Value,” has suggested an 
approach along these lines (see n13). One reason to resist expanding the problem in this way is 
that, if there is no limit to the utility a human can experience in a finite amount of time, the ma-
trix would allow for a “super-worldview,” or a worldview that claims to give more pleasure than 
all the other worldviews. The amount of pleasure could be so large that this worldview would 
have the highest EV, even if one’s credence in it is extremely low.
13. Hájek, “Waging War on Pascal’s Wager,” section 4.
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4.2. Ratio in the Limit
The second way in which we want to deal with infinity differently is that 
we want to focus on finding the ratio in the limit between two (or more) 
rewards, instead of simply multiplying everything by infinity.14 Section 3 ex-
plained how it can be rational to prefer one infinity to another. Measuring 
different infinite rewards using ratios and limits will enable us to capture the 
intuition that one infinite reward can be better than another.15
Our proposal is to find what the ratio in the limit between the two op-
tions would be; instead of multiplying the two finite amounts of utility by an 
infinite amount of time, we propose multiplying them by larger and larger 
amounts of time until one finds their ratio in the limit. In the first example 
in section 3, where one chose between receiving moderate happiness or ec-
stasy for infinity, suppose the moderate happiness was 1 unit of utility per 
day and the ecstasy was 100 units of utility per day. The ratio would be 1:100, 
and we could rationally choose the second option over the first, even though 
they are both infinite rewards. We will also include one’s credences for each 
worldview in the ratio, since our second thought experiment showed that, 
ceteris paribus, one ought to prefer the worldview for which one has a higher 
credence over the one which has a lower credence, even if they both offer the 
same infinite rewards.
Before we give an extended example, we note that a prima facie problem 
for our method involves cases where the limit is undefined, so it does not 
converge to a single number. For example, there might be a heaven where one 
receives drastically differing amounts of pleasure and pain every day. In cases 
where a worldview promises a heaven with some finite repeating pattern of 
utility per day, we can define that pattern as an interval, take the average of 
the numbers in the interval, and treat that as the limit for that worldview. If a 
worldview’s utility per day had no repetition at all, but always stayed above or 
below some value, it is possible that the worldview could be ordinally ranked 
with other options. Cases where the limit has no repetition or pattern at all 
cannot be incorporated into our method. We don’t consider this to be a se-
rious cost to our method because it is not pre-theoretically clear how one 
should rank worldviews with no repetition or patterns in afterlife utility.
14. Thanks to Graham Leach-Krouse for originally suggesting this approach. For a related 
approach, see Byl, “On Pascal’s Wager and Infinite Utilities.”
15. Bartha, “Taking Stock of Infinite Value,” has also responded to Hájek using ratios. How-
ever, our papers suggest very different methods for calculating the ratios; he uses different sizes 
of infinities, while we use limits and finite numbers. Additionally, Bartha’s paper focuses on 
showing that the use of ratios is consistent with decision theory as traditionally understood; our 
project is rather about preserving Pascal’s idea that we have a strong decision theoretic reason to 
pay attention to possible infinite goods and harms in the afterlife.
68 Philosophia Christi
4.3. Maximizing Expected Value
We will now work through an example of how this system would work 
with eight simplified worldviews and a fictional agent named Peter who must 
choose between them. Before we go through the example, one important ca-
veat: some might say that our version is no longer Pascal’s Wager, since (as 
you will see from the example) Christianity no longer automatically comes 
out on top regardless of credence. However, that is not the goal of our project. 
When we say we are salvaging the wager, we take the goal to be providing a 
decision theoretic apparatus that gives us a strong decision theoretic reason 
to pay special attention to possible infinite goods and harms in the afterlife.
Example: Peter is choosing between eight worldviews. Each worldview 
has a credence, a per-time-period amount of pleasure/utility, a length of time 
for which the reward will be experienced, a per-time-period amount of suf-
fering/disutility for choosing incorrectly, and a length of time for which the 
punishment will be experienced. We will use basic versions of most world-
views in order to keep the example as simple as possible.16 Universalism 
represents the view that everyone gets into heaven. Plato’s worldview is very 
loosely based on a worldview described by Plato in the Republic with a 10,000 
year afterlife.
Table 4.
Worldview Credence Utility/ Pleasure
Disutility/ 
Pain
Time 
Period
Atheism (A) (.5) 10u 10d 100 years
Universalism (U) (.2) 10u 0
Plato (Pl) (.1) 10u 10d 10,000 years
Buddhism (B) (.1) 10u 10d 100 trillion years
Mormonism (M) (.03) 10u 10d
Hinduism (H) (.03) 10u 10d
Islam (Is) (.03) 10u 20d
Christianity (C) (.01) 10u 20d
We now plug these values into a standard decision theory matrix. The left 
column is the action of believing a certain worldview (or doing whatever 
is necessary in order to get the rewards of that worldview. This might in-
16. For the sake of simplifying the example, we also assume that the length of time for reward 
and punishment is the same for all worldviews.
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clude practicing that worldview or doing certain good works—whatever that 
worldview requires). The top row is the state of the world where that world-
view is true. The value in each inside square is the credence multiplied by 
the per time period amount of utility or disutility. In order to calculate the 
EV, units of utility will be treated as positive numbers and units of disutility 
will be treated as negative numbers. Once everything else is calculated, we 
will multiply each value by increasingly higher finite numbers representing 
the length of time in heaven or hell, until we find the ratio in the limit of the 
values between the various worldviews.
Table 5.
1 
Year A(.5) U(.2) Pl(.1) B(.1) M(.03) H(.03) Is(.03) C(.01) EV
bA 5 2 −1 −1 −.3 −.3 −.6 −.2 3.6
bU −5 2 −1 −1 −.3 −.3 −.6 −.2 −6.4
bPl −5 2 1 −1 −.3 −.3 −.6 −.2 −4.4
bB −5 2 −1 1 −.3 −.3 −.6 −.2 −4.4
bM −5 2 −1 −1 .3 −.3 −.6 −.2 −5.8
bH −5 2 −1 −1 −.3 .3 −.6 −.2 −5.8
bIs −5 2 −1 −1 −.3 −.3 .3 −2 −5.5
bC −5 2 −1 −1 −.3 −.3 −.6 .1 −6.1
After one year, Atheism appears to be the clear winner; this is mostly due 
to Atheism being given the highest credence. We now factor in time periods. 
First, we will multiply every value by 100, which will give us the EVs of each 
worldview after 100 years. This gives us the same ratio of EV’s as the above 
matrix since every worldview has a reward/punishment time period that lasts 
at least 100 years.
Table 6.
100 
Years A(.5) U(.2) Pl(.1) B(.1) M(.03) H(.03) Is(.03) C(.01) EV
bA 500 200 −100 −100 −30 −30 −60 −20 360
bU −500 200 −100 −100 −30 −30 −60 −20 −640
bPl −500 200 100 −100 −30 −30 −60 −20 −440
bB −500 200 −100 100 −30 −30 −60 −20 −440
bM −500 200 −100 −100 30 −30 −60 −20 −580
bH −500 200 −100 −100 −30 30 −60 −20 −580
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100 
Years A(.5) U(.2) Pl(.1) B(.1) M(.03) H(.03) Is(.03) C(.01) EV
bIs −500 200 −100 −100 −30 −30 30 −20 −550
bC −500 200 −100 −100 −30 −30 −60 10 −610
After 100 years, Atheism is still the clear winner. Next, we multiply every 
worldview with a time period of 10,000 or greater by 10,000. This changes the 
results somewhat, since Atheism hits a ceiling once it gets to 100 years, so its 
values will stay the same while the values for other worldviews increase.
Table 7.
10k 
Years A(.5) U(.2) Pl(.1) B(.1) M(.03) H(.03) Is(.03) C(.01) EV
bA 500 200k −100k −100k −30k −30k −60k −20k −239,500
bU −500 200k −100k −100k −30k −30k −60k −20k −140,500
bPl −500 200k 100k −100k −30k −30k −60k −20k 59,500
bB −500 200k −100k 100k −30k −30k −60k −20k 59,500
bM −500 200k −100k −100k 30k −30k −60k −20k −80,500
bH −500 200k −100k −100k −30k 30k −60k −20k −80,500
bIs −500 200k −100k −100k −30k −30k 30k −20k −50,500
bC −500 200k −100k −100k −30k −30k −60k 10k −110,500
Note: k = 1,000
Increasing the time period to 10,000 years has drastically changed our 
results. Atheism now has the absolute lowest EV. Universalism also looks ter-
rible, although it is no longer dead last. Platonism and Buddhism have moved 
to the top two spots thanks to their high credences and the fact that they 
haven’t hit their afterlife timeline ceilings yet. Next, we multiply each value 
(with a time period greater than or equal to 100 trillion) by 100 trillion.17
Table 8.
100T 
Years A(.5) U(.2) Pl(.1) B(.1) M(.03) H(.03) Is(.03) C(.01) EV
bA 500 200T −100T −100T −30T −30T −60T −20T −40T
bU −500 200T −100T −100T −30T −30T −60T −20T −40T
bPl −500 200T 100T −100T −30T −30T −60T −20T −40T
17. To simplify, we rounded up all the numbers in the EV column to exclude anything below 
1 trillion. Further, technically there is +500 for Atheism and –100k for Platonism, but, as with the 
rest of this column, this is negligible when dealing with numbers as large as 40 trillion.
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100T 
Years A(.5) U(.2) Pl(.1) B(.1) M(.03) H(.03) Is(.03) C(.01) EV
bB −500 200T −100T 100T −30T −30T −60T −20T 160T
bM −500 200T −100T −100T 30T −30T −60T −20T 20T
bH −500 200T −100T −100T −30T 30T −60T −20T 20T
bIs −500 200T −100T −100T −30T −30T 30T −20T 50T
bC −500 200T −100T −100T −30T −30T −60T 10T −10T
Note: T = trillion
After 100 trillion years, Platonism has moved down from being tied for 
first to being tied for last. Buddhism has now become the clear favorite due 
to its high credence and the fact that its ceiling for length of afterlife has not 
been reached yet. The benefits and rewards of Atheism and Platonism have 
both become negligible. Next, we multiply by a 100 googol.18
Table 9.
1g 
Years A(.5) U(.2) Pl(.1) B(.1) M(.03) H(.03) Is(.03) C(.01) EV
bA 500 200g −100k −100T −30g −30g −60g −20g 60g
bU −500 200g −100k −100T −30g −30g −60g −20g 60g
bPl −500 200g 100k −100T −30g −30g −60g −20g 60g
bB −500 200g −100k 100T −30g −30g −60g −20g 60g
bM −500 200g −100k −100T 30g −30g −60g −20g 120g
bH −500 200g −100k −100T −30g 30g −60g −20g 120g
bIs −500 200g −100k −100T −30g −30g 30g −20g 150g
bC −500 200g −100k −100T −30g −30g −60g 10g 90g
Note: g = googol
The generosity of the Universalist God has allowed everyone to move 
back into the black. But the four worldviews which were all early favorites—
Atheism, Universalism, Platonism, and Buddhism—have all moved into last 
place. Meanwhile, Islam, which hasn’t made much noise so far, has moved 
into first place. This is due to the extreme severity of its hell combined with 
18. A googol is 10100 or 1 followed by 100 zeroes. To simplify, we rounded up all the numbers 
in the EV column to exclude anything below one googol. Further, there is technically +500 for 
Atheism and –100k for Platonism, but, as with the rest of this column, this is negligible when 
dealing with numbers as large as 60 googol.
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the fact that there is no other exclusivist infinite afterlife worldview with a 
higher credence. Next we multiply by a 100 googolplex.19
Table 10.
100gp 
Years A(.5) U(.2) Pl(.1) B(.1) M(.03) H(.03) Is(.03) C(.01) EV
bA 500 200gp −100k −100T −30gp −30gp −60gp −20gp 60gp
bU −500 200gp −100k −100T −30gp −30gp −60gp −20gp 60gp
bPl −500 200gp 100k −100T −30gp −30gp −60gp −20gp 60gp
bB −500 200gp −100k 100T −30gp −30gp −60gp −20gp 60gp
bM −500 200gp −100k −100T 30gp −30gp −60gp −20gp 120gp
bH −500 200gp −100k −100T −30gp 30gp −60gp −20gp 120gp
bIs −500 200gp −100k −100T −30gp −30gp 30gp −20gp 150gp
bC −500 200gp −100k −100T −30gp −30gp −60gp 10gp 90gp
Note: gp = googolplex
As we multiply by larger and larger numbers the ratio of the EVs will 
even out to 6:6:6:6:12:12:15:9 or 2:2:2:2:4:4:5:3. The ratio as the length of time 
approaches infinity is 2:2:2:2:4:4:5:3. This means that, in order to maximize 
EV, Peter ought to choose Islam.
4.4. Addressing Many Gods and Mixed Strategies
This approach allows us to rank infinite utilities while still maintaining 
the structure of standard decision theory approaches. In some sense, this ap-
proach incorporates the many-gods objection into the wager instead of try-
ing to find a way around it. Nonetheless, the conclusion of the many-gods 
objection that all worldviews given a credence greater than 0 and an infinite 
afterlife have the same EV is not correct. Our thought experiments show that 
considering them equal is counterintuitive, and our framework provides a 
way to compare these worldviews in a standard decision-theory matrix. But 
what about the idea that Atheism+ is the case, so atheists go to heaven and 
theists go to hell? Since Atheism+ is a worldview promising infinite rewards/
punishments, it would not get washed out by the other infinite worldviews 
as standard Atheism does in our example. However, when the many-gods 
objection is applied to our new formulation of the wager, Atheism+ would 
19. A googolplex is a 10 to the power of a googol (10googol) or 1 followed by a googol zeroes. 
To simplify, we rounded up all the numbers in the EV column to exclude anything below 1 
googolplex. Further, there is technically +500 for Atheism and –100k for Platonism, but, as with 
the rest of this column, this is negligible when dealing with numbers as large as 60 googolplex.
Elizabeth Jackson and Andrew Rogers 73
only promote a nontheistic worldview when one’s credence for Atheism+ is 
sufficiently high. People with a sufficiently high credence in Atheism+ should 
thus remain atheists.20 In this, if one thinks that salvaging the wager requires 
a theistic position to win, then they may not find our project satisfying. How-
ever, for most people, Atheism+ will lose out to another infinite worldview 
in which they have a higher credence. Generally, with the new version of the 
wager, the force of the many-gods objection is significantly diminished.
Our approach also incorporates the mixed strategies objection. Any 
mixed strategy approach such as flipping a coin and then believing the world-
view if heads can be included in the decision matrix. However, none of these 
mixed strategies will ever have as high of an expected as simply converting 
to the worldview with the highest expected value without a coin flip. This is 
because one now needs to (multiply the value per year * credence) by 0.5 (the 
probability of getting heads), and this mixed strategy will change the final 
ratios, privileging the pure strategies over the mixed ones.
5. Addressing Additional Objections
A number of other objections have been raised to Pascal’s Wager; some 
apply to our revised version of the wager above. We now turn to those objec-
tions.
5.1. Infinite Possible Number 
of Worldviews Objection
Our sample matrix only includes a small number of worldviews. How-
ever, there are many more possible worldviews or gods that we could add. In 
theory, one could come up with infinitely more possible gods, each of whom 
eternally punish and reward people for something different. If we wanted to 
take all these worldviews into consideration, our decision matrix would end 
up having an infinite number of columns and rows.
If one takes this objection seriously, it creates a problem for all decision 
theory. In every given situation, there are an infinite number of possible ways 
the world could be. We could never use decision theory to make rational 
decisions if one insisted that every possible way the world could be must be 
included in every decision matrix. So, of course, we will have to rule out some 
options and represent the probability space in a particular way—just as we do 
20. But see Mougin and Sober’s “Betting against Pascal’s Wager,” sections 3 and 4, for argu-
ments in favor of betting on Atheism+. Thanks to Elliott Sober. 
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in any standard decision table.21 The choice between religions should not be 
treated differently than any other decision problem.
5.2. Psychological, Epistemic, 
and Bet Hedging Objections
One might object that there are epistemic and/or psychological prob-
lems with simply choosing to believe something because it has the highest 
expected utility in a decision matrix. For example, one might argue that we 
do not have the ability to believe a particular religion at will.22 First, we note 
that many religions might not require belief for conversion: some may teach 
that trying to believe, having faith, taking certain kinds of morally good ac-
tions, or making a lifelong commitment to a religion are sufficient. However, 
no matter what a religion requires for conversion, this objection can be incor-
porated into the wagerer’s decision matrix. In addition to multiplying by the 
credence that the worldview is true, which is already part of the calculation, 
one ought to also multiply by the probability that attempting to convert will 
be successful.
A similar objection is that it is epistemically irrational or morally irre-
sponsible to believe on the basis of expected value instead of on the basis 
on evidence.23 Our response is that this can also be incorporated into the 
framework by assigning a cost to breaking the epistemic or moral rule and 
subtracting that cost from (utility per year × credence × probability of suc-
cessful conversion). Other factors, such as the degree to which certain reli-
gions allow you to hedge your bets while still receiving eternal rewards, can 
be factored into the matrix in a similar way.
21.  For discussion, see Elizabeth Jackson, “How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away 
Pragmatic Encroachment,” Philosophical Quarterly 69 (2019): 511–33; Jacob Ross and Mark 
Schroder, “Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 88 (2014): 259–88.
22. Those who defend or discuss this objection include Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief ”; Flew, 
The Presumption of Atheism, 64; Nicholl, “Pascal’s Wager: The Bet Is Off ”; Mackie, The Miracle 
of Theism, 203; Oppy, “On Rescher on Pascal’s Wager,” 167. For an alternative response to this 
objection, see Elizabeth Jackson, “Wagering against Divine Hiddenness,” European Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 8, no. 4 (2016): 100. Doxastic involuntarism, the idea that we do not have 
voluntary control over our beliefs, is the orthodox view in the literature; see Bernard Williams, 
“Deciding to Believe,” in Problems of the Self (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
136–51; William Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification,” Philosophi-
cal Perspectives 2 (1988): 257–99; Pamela Hieronymi, “Believing at Will,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 35 (2009): 149–87.
23. Those who defend or discuss this objection include Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, 201; 
Duff, “Pascal’s Wager and Infinite Utilities,” 108; Ward, “Religious Conversion, Self‐Deception, 
and Pascal’s Wager,” 173; Jordan, Pascal’s Wager, 38–9. Alternative responses include Pascal, Pen-
sées, fragments 233–41; Golding “Pascal’s Wager”; Rota, Taking Pascal’s Wager.
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5.3. Hell and Divine Justice
One might object that the omnibenevolence and justice of God is incon-
sistent with the existence of hell. Since a good and just God wouldn’t send 
people to hell, we can rule out worldviews that posit both omnibenevolence/
justice and hell a priori; wagering is thus unnecessary (or would look quite 
different than we propose above). Our response is threefold.
An initial response is that divine omnibenevolence isn’t inconsistent 
with the existence of hell, because our eternal destiny is not God’s decision; 
it is up to us. God does not “send people to hell,” but hell is something that 
people freely choose. Al-Ghazālī illustrates this response as follows:
Thou prepared clothing to shield thee from the cold of winter, yet 
makest no preparation for the afterlife. Thy state is like that of a man 
who in mid-winter should say, ‘I will wear no warm clothing, but trust 
to God’s mercy to shield me from the cold.’ He forgets that God, at the 
same time that He created cold, showed man the way to make clothing 
to protect himself from it, and provided the material for that clothing. 
Remember this also, O soul, that thy punishment hereafter will not be 
because God is angry with thy disobedience; and say not, ‘How can my 
sin hurt God?’ It is thy lusts themselves which will have kindled the 
flames of a hell within thee; just as, from eating unwholesome food, 
disease is caused in a man’s body, and not because his doctor is vexed 
with him for disobeying his orders.24
Hell isn’t something randomly imposed on people by God, but rather the 
result of human free decision. On this model, it is much less clear that hell 
and omnibenevolence conflict. One might worry, nonetheless, that even if we 
freely choose hell, the idea of punishing us infinitely is still inconsistent with 
divine justice, since our sins aren’t infinite. This brings us to two additional 
responses.
A number of theologians and philosophers have argued that it is pos-
sible for a just God to send humans to an infinite hell. For instance, Oliver 
Crisp argues hell is infinite because “all sin against this God incurs an infinite 
demerit, since it is an affront to the infinite glory and honour of God, thereby 
accruing an infinite disvalue.”25 Rogers and Conroy similarly argue that, if 
God is infinite, then God can feel infinite pain.26 Given certain retributivist 
principles, if God feels infinite pain when some human sins, God is justified 
24. Al-Ghazālī, The Alchemy of Happiness, chap. 6: “Concerning self-examination and the 
recollection of God.”
25. Oliver Crisp, “Divine Retribution: A Defence,” Sophia 42, no. 2 (2003): 37. See also St. An-
selm, Cur Deus Homo, trans. Sidney Norton Dean (Chicago: Open Court, 1903), 1:21; Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.87, a.4, arg.2; Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin, ed. Clyde A. 
Holbrooke (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970); Jonathan Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
26. Andrew Rogers and Nathan Conroy, “A New Defense of the Strong View of Hell,” in The 
Concept of Hell, ed. B. McCraw and R. Arp (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 49–65.
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in punishing them infinitely. Finally, C. S. Lewis and Michael Murray suggest 
a model on which the inhabitants in hell keep sinning, and thus their sins (in-
cluding those committed in hell) are, in fact, infinite.27 Overall, if there’s even 
some chance at least one of these arguments succeeds, then there is a reason 
to pay attention to the infinite consequences of your actions with respect to 
the possibility of hell. In other words, one need not conclude that these argu-
ments successfully establish that hell is just, but something much weaker: that 
hell is on the table as a live possibility.
Even so, the possibility of hell is not a necessary condition for a version 
of Pascal’s Wager to succeed. First, if one thinks annihilationism is possible, 
and, for example, everyone either goes to heaven or is annihilated, then one 
has reason to wager, in order to maximize their chance at going to heaven 
rather than being annihilated. Second, a version of Pascal’s Wager is consis-
tent with universalism, given the possibility of levels of heaven that vary in 
terms of infinite goodness (for example, ten versus twelve units of happiness 
per day). On this version of the wager, you have reason to take actions that 
maximize your chance at getting into the higher level of heaven possible.
5.4. The Homer Simpson Objection
The renowned philosopher Homer Simpson once said, “Suppose we’ve 
chosen the wrong god. Then, every time we go to church, we’re making him 
madder and madder.” Homer’s remarks hint at the following theological posi-
tion: God is a very jealous God. God wants you to pick the correct religion. 
However, God also strongly prefers that you “remain neutral” and not prac-
tice any theistic religion at all (for example, live as an atheist or agnostic) 
rather than practice the wrong religion. In this sense, atheism and agnosti-
cism are less risky than practicing a religion. On this theological view, maybe 
atheists and agnostics are annihilated, but those who practice the wrong reli-
gion will suffer in an especially painful hell (maybe significantly more painful 
than heaven is pleasurable).28 This kind of scenario has the implication that it 
may not be always rational to convert to a religion that offers infinite rewards 
and punishments; whether one should convert to a religion depends on more 
wholistic facts about their decision table.
We have four things to note in response. One, above, we’ve purpose-
fully framed things in terms of the importance of paying attention to possible 
infinite afterlife payoffs. We acknowledge that this means our framework 
may not always favor practicing theistic or infinite worldviews. It does mean, 
though, that one should pay attention to the infinite consequences of their 
27. C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1945); Michael Murray, “Heaven 
and Hell,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (New Bruns-
wick: Rutgers University Press, 2002).
28. Thanks to Ofra Magidor for raising this objection.
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actions; the finite will only come in to break ties among infinite options. Our 
framework suggests, quite controversially, that it is irrational to ignore poten-
tial afterlife rewards and punishments.
Two, there are reasons to doubt Homer Simpson’s theology. Many reli-
gions prescribe the same kinds of actions, for example, helping to the poor, 
prayer, attending religious services, and tithing. Thus, even if you’re practic-
ing the wrong religion, you would still be taking a lot of actions prescribed by 
the true religion. This is a reason to think that God would prefer you practice 
some religion, even a false one, rather than not practicing a theistic religion 
at all. This is especially salient if, for example, Christians and Muslims wor-
ship the same God. For instance, imagine that you have two children and you 
invite them both to your fiftieth wedding anniversary. The first child comes 
to the party but brings you a gift that isn’t exactly what you wanted because 
they have some false beliefs about your desires. The second child ignores the 
invitation completely and says that you don’t exist. Which is the better child?
Three, potentially for reasons similar to those just mentioned, it is likely 
that many reading this won’t agree with Homer’s theology. However, if you 
do agree with Homer’s theology, then we admit that it may not be rational for 
you to practice a religion, in the same way that if you have a high credence 
in Atheism+, you should remain an atheist. We reiterate that our goal is not 
to argue that everyone should practice Christianity, or even that everyone 
should practice a theistic religion.
Finally, as noted in section 5.3, there are versions of Pascal’s Wager that 
exclude hell and only include heaven; for instance, ones on which everyone 
who doesn’t go to heaven is annihilated. On these versions of Pascal’s Wager, 
Homer’s objection does not apply, and many of these versions prescribe prac-
ticing infinite religions.
5.5. Pascal’s Mugging Objection
In “Pascal’s Mugging,” Nick Bostrom asks us to imagine a scenario like 
the following: a philosophical mugger comes up to you in a dark alley and 
claims that, if you give him your wallet now, then he’ll give you a trillion 
times the money in your wallet tomorrow. If your credence that he’s telling 
the truth is less than one in a trillion, then imagine a scenario where he of-
fers you an amount that is more than the inverse of your credence. It seems 
irrational to give the mugger your wallet, but if you accept the reasoning of 
Pascal’s Wager then, Bostrom maintains you should accept the reasoning of 
Pascal’s mugger as well. The Pascal’s mugging argument can be formalized as 
follows:
(1) In Pascal’s mugging, you ought not wager (that is, give the mugger 
your wallet).
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(2) Pascal’s mugging is relevantly similar to Pascal’s Wager.
(3) Thus, in Pascal’s Wager, you ought not wager (that is, believe in 
God).
First, note that there are different versions of the Pascal’s mugger objec-
tion—finite versions, in which the mugger only offers you finite goods, and 
infinite versions, where the mugger claims that infinite goods are at stake. In 
Bostrom’s original paper, he only considers the finite version of the mugging, 
but we will consider both versions for the sake of completeness.
We have three responses to the Pascal’s mugging objection. First, when 
dealing with finite version, one could respond by arguing that as the mugger’s 
claims get more extreme, your credence that he will deliver should lower in 
proportion; thus, your credence would never be high enough to accept the 
mugger’s offer. If the mugger asks for your credence before making the offer, 
then that gives you new evidence that he is not to be trusted. This response 
rejects premise two. (Note also that this response could be extended to the 
infinite version if one accepts the possibility of infinitesimal credences.)
Second, underlying premise two is an assumption about cases like Pas-
cal’s mugging; namely, that in cases with a similar structure, it is irrational 
to take the mugger’s offer. We maintain this assumption is contentious. Note 
first that cases that share the structure of Pascal’s mugging are relatively com-
mon. When you see an advertisement that implies that you’ll be rich, success-
ful, attractive, or skilled, if you buy a certain product, your case is structur-
ally similar to Pascal’s mugging. Many ads we see every day imply that you’ll 
acquire the talent of a professional athlete if you wear certain shoe or drink a 
certain sports drink.
Further, in structurally similar cases, it is not at all obvious that it is ir-
rational to “accept the mugger’s offer”; intuitions about when acceptance is 
rational are likely to be largely situational. Consider: when people ask you to 
donate time or money or make lifestyle changes in order to support a cause 
related to some potential catastrophic event, like global warming, a world-
wide nuclear war, or runaway artificial superintelligence, one could say they 
are using a Pascal’s mugging strategy on you. These cases are especially ap-
plicable in a time where the idea of uploading consciousness and achieving 
eternal life through technology is discussed seriously by philosophers and 
scientists. When people try to sell you on some new life-extending or life-
saving technology, your case is similar to Pascal’s Mugging. In many of these 
cases, it could be rational to accept the mugger’s proposal, by, for example, 
trying a risky new medication or treatment for a life-threatening illness.29 If, 
in some cases similar to the mugging case, it is rational to take the offer, then 
there must be some principled difference between the mugging and these 
other cases. And it is not at all obvious that Pascal’s wager would fall on the 
29.  See Al-Ghazālī, The Alchemy of Happiness, who discusses religion as a cure for death 
(chap. 6).
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irrational side of whatever line we draw between these cases. This response 
applies to both finite and infinite versions of the mugging, as some of the ex-
amples might include infinite utility (for example, uploading your conscious-
ness to a computer so you can live indefinitely after your biological death or 
investing in new scientific advancements that purport to cure all diseases and 
enable immortality).
Our third response to Pascal’s mugging is that most decisions, including 
the decision to give the wallet to the mugger, carry the possibility of infinite 
risk and reward. Why think this? Well, one, our actions might determine 
whether we go to heaven or hell. Two, even in situations where that isn’t the 
case, our actions could determine the degree of infinite reward in heaven 
or punishment in hell. For example, given the emphasis that most religions 
place on giving to the poor, it seems plausible that most decisions regarding 
money are moral—ones that God cares about. And any moral decision has 
potentially infinite consequences, even from a self-interested perspective, be-
cause it could be a deciding factor in the degree of afterlife infinite reward or 
punishment. For instance, making the morally right choice in a certain situa-
tion could cause one to be upgraded from receiving ten units of pleasure per 
moment in heaven to receiving eleven moments of pleasure per moment in 
heaven. Thus, making the correct choice, even in a seemingly minor decision, 
can cause an infinite increase in pleasure. Given all our decisions include the 
possibility of infinite risk and reward, the finite versions of the mugger will be 
washed out, and the infinite versions of the mugging could be outweighed by 
other infinite considerations. This response also provides grounds for deny-
ing premise two, on both the finite and infinite versions; you ought not give 
the mugger your wallet, because his claims are trumped by the weightiness of 
other considerations that bear on how we ought to act.
5.6. Temporal Discounting Objection
One might object that rational agents are future discounters. That is, they 
care less about what happens to them in the far future than what happens to 
them in the more immediate future. Depending on the discount function, far 
off experiences may be weighed less (for example, in proportion to how far 
away they are), or may not be given any weight at all. Either way, a rational 
agent would care more about experiences in the near future, and not care 
(or care very little) about what happens to them in, for example, 100 million 
years.30 In our model above, we weighed the utility at all times of an agent’s 
life equally, but without this assumption, it isn’t obvious we have the same 
kind of reason to care about the afterlife. Given the centrality of afterlife con-
30. Thanks to Laura Callahan for raising this objection.
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siderations to Pascal’s Wager, this threatens not only the version above but 
many, if not all, versions of the wager.
In response, first, it is controversial whether temporal discounting is 
rational. While economists often assume it is rational, many philosophers 
disagree.31 To motivate why philosophers think this, consider the “marshmal-
low test” experiment, in which children were given the choice between one 
marshmallow now or two marshmallows after a short waiting period.32 In 
this case, assuming the children prefer two marshmallows to one, it is natural 
to think that the children who chose the one marshmallow were, in some 
sense, prudentially irrational. We make similar judgments about people who 
neglect their far-off future by failing to plan ahead or save for retirement. 
Or consider the avid smoker, who continues with the habit because he cares 
more about the current enjoyment of smoking than any long-term health 
detriments smoking might cause. One obvious way to explain why these 
agents seem irrational is because it is irrational to care more about the im-
mediate future than the far future.
Second, it is worth noting that the Pascalian reasoning we endorse above 
will still have bite for certain kinds of future discounters, namely, those whose 
discount functions have no sharp drop off point. If you care about the very 
distant future, but just care about it less than the closer future, your actions 
still have potentially infinite consequences that you should to pay attention 
to; they will just be weighed differently than someone who does not discount 
the far future.33 Thus, to get this objection off the ground, one not only needs 
to assume that future discounting is rational, but also that a discount func-
tion with a sharp drop off point is rational.34 
To show why having a sharp drop-off point in your discount function 
seems irrational, consider the following thought experiment. Let’s suppose 
you have a discount function on which you only care about what happens to 
you for the next 500 years; then your discount function drops off sharply and 
you no longer care. Then, suppose I give you a choice between two 1,000-year 
futures, both on which you experience the same happy life for the next 500 
31. See, e.g. Megan Sullivan, Time Biases: A Theory of Rational Planning and Personal Persis-
tence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
32. Walter Mischel, Ebbe B. Ebbesen, and Antonette Raskoff Zeiss, “Cognitive and Atten-
tional Mechanisms in Delay of Gratification,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21 
(1972): 204–18.
33. The one exception would be asymptotic functions that eventually drops into the infini-
tesimals, but, given how controversial infinitesimals are, this kind of function is likely to be quite 
rare.
34. It is also worth noting that positing a sharp drop off point is not sufficient to render wa-
gering irrational. The point at which the drop off occurs and one’s credence in various afterlives 
are both relevant for determining whether those with drop-off discount functions should wager. 
While posting a drop off point does take the possibility of infinity utility off the table (assuming 
super tasks are impossible for humans; see footnote 10), one might still have good reason to care 
about the finite goods and harms that could take place in the afterlife, and thus might have a 
reason to take the wager. 
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years. On future 1, after the first 500 years, you are tortured for 500 years. On 
future 2, after the first 500 years, you live blissfully for the second 500 years. 
Given your discount function, you should be indifferent between these two 
futures, and, if I paid you one dollar to pick future 1, you should do so. Note 
also that you can substitute any amount of time for the 500 years (depending 
on the discount function) and get similar results. The absurdity of this con-
clusion calls into question whether discount functions with a sharp drop off 
can ever be rational. Thus, our first response to this objection is that it is not 
at all clear whether the discount functions required to invalidate Pascalian 
reasoning are rational.
Now we turn to a second response to the discounting objection, in which 
we argue that many of the considerations that motivate the rationality of fu-
ture discounting either (i) don’t apply in the Pascalian case or (ii) are not well 
motivated. We do so by considering various possible motivations for future 
discounting.
One, you might discount the future because you don’t know when you 
will die. You might care less about what happens to you in fifty years because 
there is a higher probability you will be dead then. However, this consider-
ation drops out when considering religious promising afterlife and resurrec-
tion. The possibility of death actually works in favor of Pascalian reasoning, 
because it makes afterlife considerations all the more pressing. Thus, (i) ap-
plies; this kind of reasoning isn’t relevant in the Pascalian case. 
A second reason you might discount is because you have less certainty 
about what the world will be like in the future. For example, you might prefer 
to bet on the behavior of a certain stock tomorrow rather than its behavior 
in twenty years, because you have less certainty about what the stock market 
will be like that far into the future. The latter bet is much riskier. However, 
betting on a religion is very different than betting on stocks or economic 
trends, because, while the value of a stock is continually changing, the truth 
value of a religious claim does not change. The worldview that is true today 
will also be true in the far future. Again, (i) applies; this kind of reasoning isn’t 
relevant in the Pascalian case.
Third, you might care less about the future because you doubt your per-
sonal identity will continue through time. You might be unsure that you will 
be the same person many years from now. Since you’re more likely to be the 
same person tomorrow than 500 years from now, you might have stronger 
preferences about tomorrow than about 500 years from now. To quote Hom-
er Simpson again, “That’s a problem for future Homer! Man, I don’t envy that 
guy!”
In response, first, we can incorporate this objection into the decision 
matrix in a similar way to the other objections addressed in section 5.2, that 
is, by factoring the probability you will survive death into the decision matrix. 
Even if you hold to a theory of personal identity that doesn’t allow you to sur-
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vive your biological death, there’s some chance that you’re wrong and you do 
survive; you can incorporate this probability into the decision table. Second, 
even if you’re sure your personal identity doesn’t continue into the far future, 
you may still have reason to care about what happens to that future being. 
That person is still related to you in some (potentially significant) way; this 
might give you a reason to care, and thus to wager. Further, even if you are 
absolutely certain that that future person is not related to you in any signifi-
cant way at all (that is, assign it probability 1), you still might have the desire 
to save a random person from hell. This desire could make wagering rational. 
Thus, (ii) applies; this reasoning is relevant, but ultima facie does not provide 
a case against wagering.
5.7. Transformative Experience Objection
We close by addressing on final objection, related to the previous one, 
that might justify a certain kind of radical lack of future preferences. This 
objection involves a concept called transformative experience. A transforma-
tive experience is one in which your core preferences, life goals, and world-
view change. L. A. Paul argues that becoming a parent is (at least in some 
cases) an example of a transformative experience: you might go from a self-
absorbed person who dislikes children to someone who is utterly committed 
to your child’s welfare.35 In many cases of transformative experience, from 
the present self ’s perspective, the future self is changed beyond recognition.36 
In “Transformed by Faith,” Rebecca Chan argues that transformative experi-
ence causes a special problem for defenders of Pascal’s Wager. If religious 
conversion is a transformative experience, then your current self might be so 
alienated from your future, religious self, that you cannot, given your current 
preferences, rationally decide whether to commit to a religion (at least on the 
basis of self-interest).37
In response, we first note that, from the perspective of your present self, 
it is not guaranteed that converting to a religion would be a transformative 
experience. While Chan and others adopt this as a simplifying assumption, 
it’s not clear that we are justified in assigning probability 1 to the proposition 
all cases of religious commitment are radically transformative. When decid-
ing whether to commit to a religion, you should consider both possibilities: 
that making the commitment will be transformative, and that making the 
35. L. A. Paul, Transformative Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); L. A. 
Paul, “What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting,” Res Philosophica 92 (2015): 149–70.
36.  Note that this is separable from the personal identity objection. As Rebecca Chan, 
“Transformed by Faith,” Faith and Philosophy 36 (2019): 8–9 explains, “As radical as [transfor-
mative experiences] like parenthood are, these changes are not typically taken to be changes that 
call into question the continuity of personal identity . . . metaphysically speaking, the changes in 
question aren’t existential ones—they don’t threaten the existence of the person.”
37. Chan, “Transformed by Faith,” 4–32.
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commitment won’t be transformative. Even if, given you have the experience, 
your present self can’t have rational preferences about the future, there’s al-
ways the possibility the experience isn’t transformative. On this possibility, 
you can still have rational preferences about the future, and those preferences 
can underlie a rational Pascalian commitment. The indeterminate parts of 
one’s decision table can be ruled out, in the same way that, although we can-
not rule out the possibility that induction fails in the near future, this possi-
bility needn’t be a live option when drawing up a decision table.
Second, it is unclear that transformative element of these experiences 
undermines your ability to form rational preferences about the future in the 
way that Chan and Paul suggest. For instance, when deciding whether to be-
come a parent, you can gather evidence to inform your decision by talking 
to those who were similar to you before becoming parents. In the religious 
case, you can participate in religious communities and talk to those who un-
derwent religious conversions and in order to gather evidence to inform your 
decision. Further, on many religions, God is aware of your desires, and has 
the power to satisfy them, whatever they may be. Thus, even if you undergo 
radical transformation via a religious experience, the epistemic and practical 
barriers might be overcome by the fact that God knows and can satisfy your 
desires; and converting raises the probability that God will do so. Overall, 
these considerations motivate the idea, in the religious case, that you can ra-
tionally form preferences on behalf of your future self and use those to in-
form present decisions, contra Chan and Paul.
Finally, we note that even if all the responses above fail, and transforma-
tive experiences do undermine our ability to rationally form future prefer-
ences (and religious conversion is always or usually an instance of this), this 
isn’t a special problem for Pascal. It is a problem for a wide array of potential 
transformative choices one might make, including parenthood, career deci-
sions, getting cochlear implants, and even more mundane decisions such as 
trying new foods like Vegemite.38 Thus, the transformative experience objec-
tion is a problem for everyone who maintains that decision theory applies 
widely and underlies most or all cases of rational decision making.
6. Conclusion
We have argued for a method of decision making in regards to compet-
ing worldviews which takes seriously two powerful objections to Pascal’s Wa-
ger: that there are many possible gods offering infinite rewards, and that one 
can use mixed strategies when choosing between infinite worldviews. One 
important upshot of our project is that, while infinity still does important 
38. Paul, “What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting,” 160.
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work in the wager, epistemology nonetheless still matters; the probability of a 
particular worldview is a key part of the wagerer’s decision matrix.
Thus, as in the standard version of Pascal’s Wager, our proposed method 
gives us a strong decision theoretic reason to pay attention to infinite goods 
and harms in the afterlife, but unlike the standard version of Pascal’s Wager, 
our proposed method will also advantage worldviews to which one assigns 
a higher credence. Further, many objections to Pascal’s Wager can actually 
be incorporated into the wagerer’s decision matrix, and thus do not provide 
reason to refrain from wagering altogether. While we do not claim to have 
answered every possible objection to the wager, we conclude that many tradi-
tional objections are unsuccessful.39
39. Thanks to Amanda Askill, Kenny Boyce, Lara Buchak, Bruce Glymour, Graham Leach-
Krouse, Ofra Magidor, Caleb Ontiveros, Dee Payton, Mike Rea, Blake Roeber, Elliott Sober, Jeff 
Speaks, Carsten Stolz, Stephan Stolz, Dana Sycamor, Scott Tanona, Joel Velasco, Elliott Wagner, 
Fritz Warfield, and audiences at Oxford University, Texas Tech University, Calvin College, Grand 
Valley State University, and Western Washington University for helpful comments on this paper.
